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I Comments I
Genocide In East Timor? Calling for an
International Criminal Tribunal for East
Timor In Light of Akayesu
I. Introduction
A. A Vote for Independence - and Its Aftermath
Based on a series of agreements between the Governments of
Indonesia and Portugal, and the United Nations ("U.N.")
Secretary-General, the population of East Timor participated in a
referendum on August 30, 1999, concerning the independence of
the territory from Indonesian rule.' Under the agreements,
Indonesian security authorities were given responsibility for
ensuring that the vote would be conducted absent violence or other
forms of intimidation intended to influence the vote.2 Additionally,
the parties agreed that the absolute neutrality of the Indonesian
military (TNI) and the Indonesian police was required to ensure the
1. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights
situation in East Timor, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 4th Spec.
Sess., Annex, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/S-4/CRP.1 (1999) [hereinafter Report of the
High Commissioner].
2. Id.
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fairness of the vote.3 The U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)
was formed and charged with organizing and conducting the
popular vote.4 As a result of the agreement and subsequent
preparation, the vote was conducted fairly and without major
incident.
The results of the vote were announced on September 3, 1999,
and it was determined that over seventy-eight percent of voters
opted for an independent East Timor.' The announcement of the
voting results was met with an outbreak of violence by a number of
militia groups, in which elements of the TNI were also involved.6
Among those targeted by the militia groups were people who
supported the independence of East Timor, as well as U.N. and
other international staff.' Evidence shows that thousands of East
Timorese were expelled or fled from the territory, that many were
killed, and that property was destroyed.8
In response to the violence, on October 15, 1999, the High
Commissioner for Human Rights announced the composition of an
international commission of inquiry for East Timor.9 The purpose
of the commission was to "gather and compile systematically
information on possible violations of human rights and acts which
may constitute breaches of international humanitarian law
committed in East Timor since the announcement in January 1999
of the vote." 10 The commission concluded its investigation of the
incidents in East Timor on December 14, 1999, with members of
the commission stating that further investigation into "the
allegations of atrocities should be continued with a view to bringing
those responsible to justice."" The Government of Indonesia
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. High Commissioner For Human Rights Names International Inquiry Panel
On East Timor, U.N. Press Release (15 October 1999).
10. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the
Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, 54 'h Sess., Letter of
Transmittal, Agenda Item 96, at 1, A/541726, S/2000/59, (2000) [hereinafter Report
of the International Commission].
11. Id. The International Commission of Inquiry seemed to advocate for the
creation of a truth and reconciliation commission, similar to that in South Africa,
and made no mention of an International Criminal Tribunal (ICT). The stance of
the Commission may be related to the difficulty experienced by the ICTR
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) and ICTY (International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia) in prosecuting defendants; however, such difficulty
should not end usage of the tribunals - particularly in light of the materials
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vigorously protested the creation and the recommendations of the
commission, and instead established its own commission of inquiry
to investigate the crisis in East Timor. 2 The U.N. acceded to
Indonesia's objection.
In the meantime, UNAMET restored some measure of peace
to the island, despite continued resistance from militia groups."
The TNI completely withdrew from the country, and the leader of
the East Timorese independence movement, Xanana Gusmao,
returned, opening the door for the rebuilding process to begin."
Many feel that an important step in the rebuilding process would be
to hold accountable those who perpetrated the violence in East
Timor following the independence vote. 5
B. Does East Timor Have Recourse Under International Law?
In recent years, developing nations lacking judicial resources to
prosecute those who have perpetrated violence against the citizenry
in a manner similar to that in East Timor have turned to the U.N..
Specifically, the U.N. has created separate International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia to prosecute
individuals who allegedly committed genocide during civil wars in
those countries. 6 This Comment will explore issues concerning the
contained in note 17 infra.
12. See Letter dated 26 January 2000 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Indonesia to the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, 54th Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 96, at 1, A/54/727, S/2000/65 (2000).
13. Doug Struck, E. Timor Villages Go Up in Smoke As Army Retreats, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at A13.
14. Doug Struck, U.N. Peace Force Tightens Grip on E. Timor Capital, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 1999, at A15.
15. See Report of the International Commission, supra note 10; see also East
Timor: Justice and accountability are long overdue, Amnesty International News
Release, ASA 21/202/99, October 28, 1999.
16. In addition to Rwanda's cooperation with the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the country has been conducting its
own genocide trials, and has tried and passed judgement on 1,500 suspects.
Rwanda Suspends Cooperation on Genocide with U.N. Tribunal, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7, 1999, at A36.
On November 6, 1999, Rwanda suspended its cooperation with the Tribunal
due to frustration over the progress of the trials. Id.
"These ad hoc tribunals are widely seen as trial runs for the permanent
International Criminal Court endorsed by 120 nations at a conference in Rome in
July [1998]." Bill Berkeley, Judgment Day, WASH. POST MAGAZINE, Oct. 11, 1998,
at 10, 13.
The United States has opposed the ICC, but supports the tribunals. Id.
The ICC will come into existence after sixty States deposit their
instruments of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court with the United Nations Secretary-General. It will be
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establishment and mandate of an International Criminal Tribunal
for East Timor. It will begin with the history of relations between
East Timor and Indonesia leading up to the independence vote.
The Comment will then describe the allegations of Indonesia's
human rights violations in East Timor following the August 30
independence referendum. Next, it will provide a general overview
of the process the U.N. established for promulgating an
international criminal tribunal. In order to emphasize the bases for
the creation of a tribunal, the Comment will explore the recent
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, with an analysis of the
judgement from the trial of the first individual successfully tried and
convicted of genocide by an International Criminal Tribunal, Jean-
Paul Akayesu. Two questions are considered while exploring the
case: what evidence was necessary to indict Akayesu; and how did
the Tribunal interpret the evidence in the context of its mandate
from the U.N.? From the answers to those questions, the comment
will assess the viability of an International Criminal Tribunal for
East Timor.
II. East Timor and Indonesia: Then and Now
A. A Colonial Past Gives Way to Nationalism
Timor is an island located to the north of Australia, within the
Indonesian archipelago of over 1,000 islands.17 East Timor was
settled by the Portuguese in the 1500s. The western part of the
island was colonized by the Dutch as part of what came to be
known as the Netherlands East Indies. 8 In 1949, the Dutch ended
their colonial rule of West Timor and Indonesia assumed control of
that portion of the island. 9 In 1974, following a transition of power
associated with the U.N. and will be funded by it and by State Parties
inter alia. It will be composed of 18 judges who are nationals of the State
Parties, and will be seated in the Hague. It will have jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as well as the crime of
aggression once that crime is defined. It will try individuals, irrespective
of their official capacity, and not legal persons. It will complement
national legal systems, and will accept complaints from the ICC
Prosecutor, any State Party, and the U.N. Security Council.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) In A Nutshell, available at
http://www.icj.org/icc/iccdoc/iccn.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 1999).
17. Roger S. Clark, Does the Genocide Convention Go Far Enough? Some
Thoughts on the Nature of Criminal Genocide in the Context of Indonesia's
Invasion of East Timor, 8 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 321 (1981).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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in Portugal, the Portuguese granted their colonies, including East
Timor, the right of self-determination.2' However, the Portuguese
were not properly organized to proceed systematically with East
Timor's decolonization, and a power vacuum emerged.2  One
political party, Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Associa-
tion)2 , supported by the Indonesians and intent on unifying the
island of Timor, attempted to seize power in a coup in August
1975.3 But Apodeti was defeated by another political faction,
FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor)2 ,
which preferred independence.25 Soon after FRETILIN took
21power the TNI invaded East Timor.
In the aftermath of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, serious
human rights violations were documented. 7 Observers of the
situation estimated that perhaps almost half of East Timor's 1975
population was "wiped out by warfare, disease, and starvation., 28
International aid organizations, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), were forced to leave East
Timor following the invasion and the Indonesians did not have the
will or the resources to fill the void.29 When the ICRC was allowed
to return in October 1979, they described the situation in East
Timor as among the worst they had ever seen." Between 200,000
and 300,000 Timorese had been resettled in Indonesian-controlled
camps, and the overcrowded conditions lead to the spread of
disease.3 Hundreds of civilians had been executed in the East
Timor capital of Dili during the early days of Indonesian
occupation.2 Many of the most educated, and those with leadership
ability, were reported missing and presumed killed.3 Reports of the
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Formation of East-Timorese Political Associations, at http://www.uc.pt
/timor/parties.html (last visited Nov. 21, 1999).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Clark, supra note 17, at 322.
28. Id., citing Jack Anderson, Editorial, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1979, at 11 (D.C.
Edition).
29. Clark, supra note 17, at 322.
30. Id., citing ICRC BULL. No. 49 (Feb. 6,1980).
31. Clark, supra note 17, at 323.
32. Id., citing Kamm, War-Ravaged Timor Struggles Back from Abyss, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1980, at Al.
33. Clark, supra note 17, at 323.
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use of torture techniques in the prisons were widespread but
Indonesian authorities did not permit access to the prisons.'
Within two weeks of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, a
provisional Timorese government was established, consisting of
members of the pro-Indonesian Apodeti party.35 On May 31,1976,
an "Act of Integration" was held, with the provisional government
convening a Regional People's Assembly.36  The Assembly
consisted of twenty-eight delegates, which, in a short ceremony
conducted in Portuguese without translation, signed a petition
asking then-President Soeharto of Indonesia to grant integration
with Indonesia.37 Journalists were flown in from Jakarta for a three-
hour visit to witness the act, but were not allowed to leave the
assembly building or speak to the delegates. 8 The integration of
East Timor as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia was
finalized on July 17, 1976, when President Soeharto signed the Bill
of Integration, which had been unanimously adopted by the
Indonesian parliament two days earlier. 9 It was this act that
Indonesia referred to when justifying the legality of its presence in
East Timor.'
In order to solidify its influence and presence in the territory,
Indonesia launched a series of development projects in East Timor,
including building schools, public health clinics, water supply
systems and malaria eradication programs." In addition, Indonesia
imported large numbers of Indonesian "transmigrants" from
overpopulated islands in the archipelago, a move some alleged was
meant to dilute and eventually obliterate the indigenous Timorese
population.42
B. Non-Violent Resistance to Unwanted Integration
Following East Timor's integration into Indonesia, the
FRETILIN party led East Timorese resistance to Indonesian rule.43
34. Id.
35. East Timor International Support Center, Timor Today: History -
Indonesianization, at http://www.easttimor.com/history/indonesianization.html
(last visited Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Timor Today: History - Indonesianization].
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Timor Today: History - Indonesianization, supra note 35.
40. Id.
41. Sam Oglesby, Indonesia in a Corner, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1999, at B7.
42. Id.
43. East Timor International Support Center (ETISC), Timor Today: History
- Resistance, at http://www.easttimor.com/history/resistance.html (last visited Nov.
[Vol. 19:1
GENOCIDE IN EAST TIMOR?
The first leader of the party was Nicolau Lobato, who died at the
height of the initial push by Indonesia to rid East Timor of any
resistance to Indonesian rule." After Lobato's death, the resistance
movement nearly died out as quickly as it had begun. 5 But Xanana
Gusmao brought together the remaining soldiers and followers of
FRETILIN, and formed a new national liberation army and a
national political structure called "Conselho Nacional da
Resistencia Maubere" or the "National Council of Maubere
Resistance" (CNRM) 6 The Armed Forces of National Liberation
of East Timor (FALINTIL) was created to engage in armed
opposition to Indonesia's presence in the territory.47 Gusmao also
initiated the formation of the East Timorese clandestine
movement.48 The clandestine movement was a structured organ-
ization with an executive branch, and working cells throughout East
Timor. 9 Its activities covered two broad areas: one, the supply of
intelligence, food and medicine to the armed resistance; and the
other, the organization of activities such as demonstrations which
would bring the plight of the East Timorese to the outside world.'°
From December 1975 until January 1, 1989, East Timor was
completely closed to journalists, visitors and outside influences." In
order to attract international attention and support, the clandestine
movement planned media "incidents". 2 The first of these media
"incidents" was a demonstration during Pope John Paul II's visit to
the East Timor capital of Dili in October 1989."3 The following
year, a second demonstration, planned to coincide with the visit to
Dili of the United States ambassador, was harshly curtailed in front
of foreign diplomats and tourists.54
Another group that played a key role in defending people's
rights and publicizing the plight of East Timor internationally was
the Catholic Church, specifically those priests, monks and nuns who
29, 1999) [hereinafter Timor Today: History - Resistance].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 54' Sess., Letter of Transmittal, Agenda Item 96,
at 1, U.N. Doc., at 9, A/54/726, S/2000/59 (2000).
4& Id.
49. Id.
50. Timor Today: History - Resistance, supra note 43.
51. Id.
52- Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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were themselves 'Timorese 5 Led by consecutive Timorese Bishops
of Dili, Martinho da Costa Lopes (1977-1983) and Carlos Ximenes
Belo (1983 till today), the clergy assisted the East Timorese through
documentation of human rights abuses, calls for a referendum on
independence for East Timor, and protection given to East
Timorese critics of Indonesian occupation. 6 Bishop Belo won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1997."7
C. The Quest for Independence Succeeds - With a Price
The efforts of the CNRM and the Catholic Church eventually
helped pressure Indonesia to agree to allow a referendum on
independence for East Timor." However, following the announce-
ment on September 4 of the results of the August 30 referendum, in
which eighty percent of the population voted for independence,
there was an "eruption of killing and looting."5 9 Due to the ejection
of many media and relief sources, specific details on the numbers
killed during the rampage is not fully known.' Nevertheless,
eyewitness accounts of the brutality emerged.6'
One eyewitness, corroborated by those who survived the
attack, told of acts that took place at a Roman Catholic compound
on September 6, 1999.62 The churches of East Timor had become
refuges for those fleeing the violence, and on this day hundreds of
pro-independence families had sought such refuge.63 Several
hundred militiamen gathered outside the compound, and then
proceeded to scale its fence and surround the church that stood
within the compound.' Two priests went outside to assuage the
militiamen, and each of them was murdered, the first by a machete
and the second by gunfire.6 The militiamen then searched out the
senior priest of the parish and killed him.' The eyewitness stated
55. Timor Today: History - Resistance, supra note 43.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights
Situation in East Timor, supra note 1.
59. Keith Richburg, At Evil's Edge: Horror I Thought I'd Left Behind, WASH.
POST, Sept. 26, 1999, at B1, B5.
60. Id.
61. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A Killing Ground Without Corpses, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 1999, at Al, A30 [hereinafter Chandrasekaran].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Chandrasekaran, supra note 61.
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that the order to kill the senior priest was given by a man named
Izidio Manek, a local militia leader, and he noted that several
uniformed TNI soldiers were at the church.67 The eyewitness said
he told his family to flee, and when they left the compound, they
were detained by militiamen, put on trucks and sent to a camp in
Indonesia-controlled West Timor.68 The inside of the church then
erupted, and "it sounded like a war."'69 By the time it ceased, more
than 20 bodies lie piled in front of the church."° By late October,
investigators had recovered two sets of human remains on the site."
Investigators believe that a majority of the bodies were likely
burned or taken by truck to one of the many crocodile-filled lakes
on the outskirts of the town of Suai, and dumped.
Other incidents of destruction and death wrought by the
militias, aided by Indonesian soldiers, have been reported.73 At the
Salesian Sisters' convent in Dili on the night of September 4, nuns,
who at that point were harboring 400 refugees, "watched as the
militia moved from house to house. 7' The movements of the
militia were systematic; at each house, the windows and doors were
broken, couches, tables, chairs, clothing were stolen, and, finally,
the house was set on fire. 75 The militias approached the convent
seeking out those East Timorese who voted for independence,
including Elvis Gusmao, cousin of independence leader Xanana
Gusmao, but the nuns were able to keep the militiamen at bay. 6 As
the shooting and fires continued, 400 more refugees streamed into
the convent.77 After four days hiding in the convent, many of the
refugees fled to the nearby mountains.7 ' At night, some of the men
tried to sneak into town in an effort to find food, but faced gunfire
from TNI soldiers who had taken up positions in houses
surrounding the convent.79 Two men were killed as a result.' A
nun from the convent showed reporters the body of one of the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Chandrasekaran, supra note 61.
72. Id.
73. Doug Struck, Surviving on Fibs and Faith, WASH. POST, September 23,
1999, at Al.
74. Id. at A24.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Struck, supra note 73, at A24.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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victims, and said that the TNI soldiers had placed the body of the
other victim in a plastic bag and removed it as they departed the
area.
8
'
While accounts of these incidents are supported by physical
evidence, investigators are finding it difficult to gather evidence
corroborating other accounts.' It has been reported, for example,
that "the bodies of 47 people allegedly hacked to death with
machetes were carted to the coast, placed in a boat, weighted down
with sandbags and tossed into the sea."8 By late October, three
bodies had washed ashore.'4 Furthermore, U.N. officials believed
that militiamen killed at least twenty-five people on September 6, in
an attack on the house of Bishop Belo in Dili, where thousands of
displaced people had gathered. 8' However, four nuns living in the
bishop's yard said there was no massacre and that the militia had
killed "only" one man there since the September 4 referendum.86
Regarding another incident, local newspapers, quoting hospital
sources, reported that fourteen people were shot and stabbed to
death on September 5, in an attack on a building belonging to the
Catholic diocese of Dili.' Again, an inspection by journalists and
outside observers found no evidence of death.'
The most distressing humanitarian situation continues to be
the plight of the East Timorese who are still in camps in
Indonesian-controlled West Timor.89  The refugees are being
intimidated from returning by armed militiamen who roam through
the encampments at night.90 For a time, aid workers were not
81. Id.
82. The Indonesians were quick to put the death toll at fewer than one
hundred. Richburg, supra note 59, at B5. Specifically, General Wiranto,
commander of the Indonesian armed forces, said, "it is not tens of thousands, or
hundreds of thousands, as reported by the foreign media." Keith Richburg,
Indonesia Plays Down East Timor Killings, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at A14.
Likewise, another top commander, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, rejected
allegations that war crimes had been committed in East Timor and said the
violence there was nowhere near as bad as other recent tragedies in Africa and the
Balkans. Id. As of January 10, 2000, the death toll was 1,650. See Egan, infra note
92.
83. Chandrasekaran, supra note 61.
84. Id.
85. Keith Richburg, Indonesia Plays Down East Timor Killings, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 1999, at A14.
86. Doug Struck, Evidence of Mass Killings Scarce in E. Timor, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 1999, at A23, A24.
87. Richburg, supra note 85.
88. Struck, supra note 86.
89. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Most E. Timorese Have Not Yet Come Home, UN.
Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1999, at A27.
90. Id.
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allowed inside the refugee camps in the Atambua region of western
Timor, but reports from people who escaped from those camps
suggest food and water were minimal, people were sleeping in
crowded, makeshift tents and were suffering frequent harassment
from militia members.9 As of July 26, 2000, the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) estimated
that between 85,000 and 120,000 East Timorese were still within
Indonesian borders, primarily in refugee camps in West Timor.'
What is known is that many of the people missing and presumed to
be either in a refugee camp or dead are intellectuals and the most
influential East Timorese.93 As of January 10, 2000, the death toll
based on bodies recovered and reports of grave sites was 1,650.9'
In addition to the human toll, property damage was
widespread.95 In Dili, fire destroyed the central business district,
including all of the banks, markets and restaurants.' Similarly,
throughout East Timor, large portions of other cities were
destroyed: Maliana was eighty percent destroyed, Balibo was
ninety-five percent destroyed, Liquica sixty percent destroyed,
Glenois eighty percent destroyed and Suai ninety to ninety-five
percent destroyed.' The population of Dili was reduced to about
70,000, from 175,000 before the outbreak of violence, and many of
those people left were living in tents on the beach and in parks.98
III. International Criminal Tribunals
In thinking about whether the U.N. should initiate proceedings
against those Indonesian officials and militia members culpable for
their actions in East Timor, it is important to examine the work of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
ICTR, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), "represent the first international attempt since
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II to prosecute
91. Id.
92. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, S.C. Res. 1272, at 3, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/738 (2000).
93. Carmel Egan, Mass Vanishing Remains a Mystery, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan.
10, 2000, at http://www.easttimor.com/archives/1251.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2000).
94. Id.
95. Keith Richburg, Rebuilding East Timor-From Scratch, WASH. POST, Oct.
10, 1999, at A29.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at A30.
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individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. "99
As such, they can provide the appropriate framework from which a
case can be made to create an international criminal tribunal for
East Timor. Before discussing the previous tribunals, however, it is
appropriate to briefly examine the process of creating an
international criminal tribunal.
A. Formation of an International Criminal Tribunal
The first step toward creation of an international criminal
tribunal is empowering an international commission of inquiry to
investigate the events in question." The process of creating the
commission in the case of East Timor was initiated by Portugal,
which sent a letter to the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
requesting her to convene a special session of the Commission on
Human Rights. 1 A majority of State members of the Commission
must support the convening of a special session."2  The
International Commission of Inquiry is then formed by a resolution
of the special session of the Commission on Human Rights. 3 After
receiving and reviewing the commission's report, the Secretary-
General may decide, based on the evidence provided therein, to
present the report to the Security Council of the U.N..1 "
The Security Council will then consider several factors prior to
establishing a tribunal in addition to the report presented by the
Secretary-General and the international commission of inquiry.
These factors include:
a) whether the situation continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security;
b) whether the particular circumstances of the situation mandate
prosecution because it would contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance
of peace;
99. Bill Berkeley, Judgment Day, Wash. Post Magazine, Oct. 11, 1998, at W10,
12.
100. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
available at http://www.ictr.org.
101. Annotations to the Provisional Agenda, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Hum.
Rts., 4th Special Sess., Annex, at 1, E/CN.4/S-4/1/Add. 1 (1999).
102. Id.
103. Report of the International Commission, supra note 10.
104. Id.
105. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 100.
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c) whether prosecution would contribute to ensuring that such
violations are halted and effectively redressed; and
d) whether the need for international cooperation to strengthen
the courts and judicial system of the particular country, and the
necessity for those courts to deal with large numbers of
suspects.1 '°
If the Security Council concludes, after assessing all the
information in light of these factors, that the situation in East Timor
constitutes a threat to international peace and security within the
meaning of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter'", it may, via
resolution, create an International Criminal Tribunal."'8
B. Source of Tribunal Power
The Statute of the Tribunal, which is annexed to the Security
Council Resolution creating the tribunal, and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, which are adopted by the Judges of the
tribunal, govern the actions of the tribunal.'" The tribunal for East
Timor would be mandated to prosecute "persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law ''' committed in East Timor from January 1, 1999 through
December 31, 1999.111 The tribunal is empowered by the U.N.
Security Council to pass judgement on persons who have allegedly
106. Id.
107. "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and
acts of aggression," U.N. CHARTER, chap. 7.
"In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may,
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for
in Article 39 [economic sanctions or military action], call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable. U.N. CHARTER, art. 40. Such provisional measures shall be without
prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. Id. The
Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures." Id.
108. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex 5, 4, at 4,
available at http://www.ictr.org.
109. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998), at 4.
110. Fact Sheet No. 1: The Tribunal at a Glance, at http://www.ictr.org
/ENGLISH/factsheets/factshee.htm, (visited Nov. 7, 1999).
111. These dates represent the time period within which the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights requested the international commission of inquiry to investigate
the alleged atrocities in East Timor. Report of the International Commission, supra
note 10.
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committed, inter alia, genocide, as it is defined in the Statute."2 The
maximum penalty is life in prison."3
The Statute provides that the tribunal has concurrent
jurisdiction with national courts; however, the tribunal has
primacy."' The Statute stipulates that the prosecutor, who acts as a
separate organ of the tribunal, is responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of the perpetrators of violations of the Statute.
Upon determination that a prima facie case exists to proceed
against a suspect, the prosecutor shall prepare an indictment
containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes
with which the accused is charged. 6 Thereafter, he or she shall
transmit the indictment to a trial judge for review and confirmation,
and a trial date is set."
7
C. Events Necessitating the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Juv6nal
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of
Burundi crashed at the Kigali airport in Rwanda, killing all on
board."8 The deaths of the two Presidents exacerbated long-
standing tensions between Rwanda's Hutu and Tutsi populations."9
The tensions were rooted in Rwanda's colonial past, and were
based on bigotry and distrust.2 Reports in the Hutu-dominated
media of a Tutsi conspiracy behind the downed plane further
inflamed the tensions. These tensions led to widespread killings
that had both political and ethnic dimensions, which began in the
capital, Kigali, and spread to other parts of Rwanda. 2' During the
"three-month genocide," when members of the Hutu majority
killed members of the Tutsi minority, it was reported that Tutsis
were killed at a rate "three times as quickly as Jewish dead
accumulated in Nazi Europe."'2  "At least 500,000 Tutsis were
killed between April and June 1994." 1"23 The International Criminal
112. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 6.
113. Berkeley, supra note 99, at 28.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 2.
119. Id. at 44.
120. Id.; see also Berkeley, supra note 99, at 14.
121. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 7.
122. Berkeley, supra note 99, at 10.
123. Id.
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Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in November 1994, in
response to the killings.24 The ICTR, which remains active, has
issued twenty-eight indictments against forty-eight individuals.1"
The first defendant whom the ICTR fully and successfully tried and
convicted was Jean-Paul Akayesu, who was found guilty of
genocide and crimes against humanity on September 2, 1998.126
D. The Indictment of Jean-Paul Akayesu
Jean-Paul Akayesu served as bourgmestre, a role similar to
that of a mayor, of the Taba commune from April 1993 until June
1994.127 As bourgmestre, Akayesu was charged with the perfor-
mance of executive functions and the maintenance of public order
within his commune, subject to the authority of the prefect (who is
similar to a governor)." He had exclusive control over the
communal police, was responsible for the execution of laws,
regulations, and the administration of justice - and was subject only
to the prefect's authority.129 Essentially, Akayesu was looked up to
as the political leader of the commune; the political culture of
Rwanda is such that his commands were final in the eyes of the
people."3
1. The Case Against Akayesu-The Prosecutor stated that at
least 2000 Tutsis were killed in Taba between April 7 and the end
of June 1994, while he was still bourgmestre. 3' The Prosecutor
claimed that the killings in Taba were openly committed and so
widespread that, as bourgmestre, Akayesu must have known about
them."' Although he had the authority and responsibility to do so,
Akayesu never attempted to prevent the killing of Tutsis in the
commune in any way; nor did he call for assistance from regional or
national authorities to quell the violence.133
General evidence further showed that between April 7 and the
end of June 1994, hundreds of civilians (hereinafter "displaced
civilians") sought refuge at the bureau communal."' The majority
124. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 2.
130. Berkeley, supra note 99, at 14.
131. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 10-11.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of these displaced civilians were Tutsi.'35 Several witnesses testified
that, while seeking refuge at the bureau communal, female
displaced civilians were regularly taken by armed local militia
and/or communal police and subjected to sexual violence, and/or
beaten on or near the bureau communal premises.36 Displaced
civilians were also murdered frequently on or near the bureau
communal premises.'37 Many women were forced to endure
multiple acts of sexual violence, which were at times committed by
more than one assailant.138 The witnesses further testified that these
acts of sexual violence were generally accompanied by explicit
threats of death or bodily harm.'39 The Prosecutor claimed that the
displaced female civilians lived in constant fear and their physical
and psychological health deteriorated as a result of the sexual
violence, beatings and murders.'
The indictment alleged that Akayesu knew that the acts of
sexual violence, beatings and murders were being committed and
was, at times, present during their commission."' In addition, the
Prosecutor asserted that Akayesu facilitated the commission of the
sexual violence, beatings and murders by allowing their commission
to occur on or near the bureau communal premises.42 The
Prosecutor claimed that by virtue of Akayesu's presence during the
commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders and by
failing to prevent their commission, Akayesu encouraged these
activities'
Further evidence was presented that Akayesu conducted
house-to-house searches in Taba, during which residents, including
Victim V, were interrogated and beaten with rifles and sticks in
Akayesu's presence." Victim U testified that Akayesu personally
threatened to kill her husband and child if she did not provide him
with information about the activities of the Tutsis he was seeking."5
The indictment also stated that men who, on Akayesu's
instructions, were searching for Ephrem Karangwa (then the police
chief of Taba and a Tutsi)
135. Id.
136. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 10-11.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 10-11.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 10-11.
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destroyed Ephrem Karangwa's house and burned down his
mother's house. They then went to search the house of Ephrem
Karangwa's brother-in-law in Musambira commune and found
Karangwa's three brothers there. The three brothers.., tried to
escape, but ... Akayesu blew his whistle to alert local residents
to the attempted escape and ordered the people to capture the
brothers. After the brothers were captured.... Akayesu
allegedly ordered and participated in the killings of the three
brothers.1
46
Akayesu was also charged with taking eight "detained men
from the Taba bureau communal and ordering militia members to
kill them. The militia killed them with clubs, machetes, small axes
and sticks. The victims had fled from Runda commune and had
been held by Akayesu.'
4 7
Furthermore, Akayesu allegedly "ordered the local people and
militia to kill intellectual and influential people. Five teachers from
the secondary school of Taba were killed on his instructions. The
local people and militia killed them with machetes and agricultural
tools in front of the communal." '48
Finally, Victim W testified that Akayesu picked her up in Taba
and interrogated her about the whereabouts of the wife of the
university teacher.149 "When she stated she did not know, he forced
her to lie on the road in front of his car and threatened to drive
over her."' Likewise, Victim Z testified that Akayesu picked him
up in Taba and interrogated him.' "During the interrogation, men
under Akayesu's authority forced Victims Z and Y to beat each
other and used a piece of Victim Y's dress to strangle Victim Z."'52
2. Genocide Defined Under the ICTR Statute-Article 2 of
the ICTR Statute defines genocide in the same terms used in
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter, "the Genocide
Convention"), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 9, 1948, which states
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
146. Id.
147. Id.
14& Akayesu, supra note 109, at 10-11.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; and
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
153group.
It is important to note, while applying the elements of the
crime of genocide, that culpability does not require the actual
extermination of a group in its entirety.'54 Rather, it is understood
that genocide occurs once any one of the acts listed in the Genocide
Convention is committed with the specific intent to destroy "in
whole or in part" a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
Therefore, genocide is distinct from other crimes because it
requires special intent. Special intent of a crime is the specific
intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which
demands that the perpetrator clearly seek to produce the act
charged.' The special intent in the crime of genocide lies in that
portion of the convention that requires "the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such."'58  Thus, to find that the crime of genocide has been
committed, it is necessary that one of the acts listed in the Genocide
Convention be committed, and that the particular act be committed
against a specifically targeted group, it being a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group. " 9
Of course, in assessing the perpetrator's specific intent, it is
well established that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even
impossible, to determine. For this reason, the tribunal allowed
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 177.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 178.
160. Id. at 183.
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intent to be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact,
in the absence of a confession from the accused. 6' Importantly, the
tribunal deduced the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
charged from the general context of the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against that same group,
whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by
others (emphasis added).'62 Likewise, the tribunal said that there
are other factors to be assessed when inferring the genocidal intent
of a particular act.163 These factors include the scale of atrocities
committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or
furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting
victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while
excluding the members of other groups."
Furthermore, for any of the acts listed in the Genocide
Convention to be a constitutive element of genocide, the act must
have been committed against one or several individuals, because
such individual or individuals were members of a specific group,
and specifically because they belonged to this group. The victim
of the listed act is therefore a member of a group, chosen as such,
which means that the victim of the crime of genocide is the group
itself and not only the individual. The perpetration of the act
charged therefore extends beyond its actual commission, for
example, the murder of a particular individual, to the realization of
an ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or part, the group
of which the individual is just one element.16
As to the first of the respective elements of the crime of
genocide, the tribunal interpreted subsection (a) in accordance with
the definition of murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda,
according to which "meurtre" (killing) is homicide committed with
the intent to cause death." While interpreting subsection (b), the
tribunal took serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself
161. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 183. The ICTR previously accepted the guilty
plea of Jean Kambanda on May 1, 1998 as the result of the indictment against him
charging genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder) and
crimes against humanity (extermination). ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case
No. ICTR 97-23-A (Sept. 4, 1998), at http://www.ictr.org (last visited Nov. 20,
2000).
162. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 183.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 182.
166. Id.
167. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 182.
168. Id. at 178.
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thereto, to mean acts of torture, be they bodily or mental,
inhumane or degrading treatment, or persecution. 69  As to
subsection (c), the tribunal stated that the means of deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction, in whole or part, include, inter alia,
subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes, and the reduction of essential medical
services below minimum requirement.7 ' For purposes of
interpreting subsection (d), the tribunal believed that the measures
intended to prevent births within the group, should be construed as
sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control,
separation of the sexes, and prohibition of marriages. 7' With
respect to subsection (e), the tribunal held that, as in the case of
measures intended to prevent births, the objective is not only to
sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to
sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible
transfer of children from one group to another.' Finally, the
tribunal stated that, in defining a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, it wished to respect the intention of the drafters of
the Genocide Convention, which was to ensure the protection of
'73
any stable and permanent group.
3. How Did the Tribunal Interpret the Evidence in the
Context of its Mandate from the United Nations? -The tribunal was
able to infer the genocidal intention of Akayesu from all his acts or
utterances, and from the general context in which other culpable
acts were perpetrated systematically against the same group,
regardless of whether such other acts were committed by Akayesu
or even by other perpetrators. 74  Alternatively, it found that
Akayesu incurred individual criminal responsibility for the crime of
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, which lies in the
intent to directly lead or provoke another to commit genocide.
Thus, the tribunal was able to imply that he who incites to commit
genocide also has the specific intent to commit genocide; that is, to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.76  The tribunal had already established that
169. Id. at 179.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 180.
172. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 180.
173. Id. at 181.
174. Id. at 245.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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genocide was committed against the Tutsi group in Rwanda in 1994,
throughout the period covering the events alleged in the
Indictment.'77 The tribunal was able to infer beyond a reasonable
doubt the genocidal intent of the accused from the following: the
high number of atrocities committed against the Tutsi; the
widespread nature of the atrocities, not only in the Taba commune
but also throughout Rwanda; and the fact that the victims were
systematically and deliberately selected because they belonged to
the Tutsi group (with persons belonging to other groups being
excluded)."'
Finally, with regard to rape and sexual violence, the tribunal
held, for the first time in any international criminal proceeding, that
they constitute genocide in the same way as any other act, as long as
they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a particular group, targeted as such.179 The tribunal
determined that rape and sexual violence constitute infliction of
serious bodily and mental harm on the victims, and are probably
one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim, as he or she
suffers both bodily and mental harm.'8 Sexual violence was an
integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting
Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and
to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole."' The rape of
Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi
women and solely against them."
Akayesu was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, the
maximum penalty under the ICTR Statute."
IV. Should the United Nations Create an International Criminal
Tribunal for East Timor?
Before discussing the need for a U.N.-sponsored tribunal for
East Timor, it should be noted that the Indonesian government has
insisted that there is no need for the U.N. to form an international
criminal tribunal for East Timor." Rather, the Indonesian
177. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 245.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also Berkeley, supra note 99, at 13.
180. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 246.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Berkeley, supra note 99, at 28.
184. Edward Cowan, Open doors to East Timor destruction inquiry, JAKARTA
POST, Jan. 12, 2000, available at http://www.easttimor.com/news-today/1271.htm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2000).
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government has established its own body, the Commission on
Human Rights Abuses in East Timor (KPP HAM), which is
conducting its own investigation of the matter."' The Indonesian
government's objections are couched in terms of national
sovereignty. Specifically, Indonesia notes that the events in
question took place while East Timor was an integral part of
Indonesia; therefore, Indonesian law alone should be applied.""
Furthermore, Indonesia says that their judicial mechanism is
capable of dispensing justice, in contrast to the International
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and national
remedies should be exhausted before resorting to an international
forum."
Almost all commentators familiar with the East Timor
situation are skeptical of the willingness of KPP HAM to be
thorough and unbiased in its investigation, and certainly do not feel
that the perpetrators will be brought to justice in the absence of a
U.N.-established tribunal.1 8 In fact, the Government of Indonesia
just recently agreed "in principle" to a number of requests made by
UNTAET regarding deeper investigations into the events of last
year, including interviews of 39 witnesses. 9  This development can
be viewed either as a sign of Indonesia's willingness to thoroughly
pursue prosecution of this matter, or a sign of continuing delay and
intransigence by the Indonesian government.
Either way, the door should remain open for the creation of an
International Criminal Tribunal for East Timor. To illustrate why,
this analysis begins with a critical reexamination of the relationship
between Indonesia and East Timor, and why that history spawned
the violence that followed the announcement of the results of the
vote for independence. The historical relationship may shed light
on the specific intent of the Indonesian officials to allegedly
encourage and support the violence, and may thus show their
185. Id.
186. Letter dated 26 January 2000 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Indonesia to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., A/54/727, S/2000/65,
Jan. 31, 2000.
187. Id.
188. Cowan, supra note 194; see also Richard McGregor, Lawyer track proof of
Timor atrocities, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 10, 2000, http://www.easttimor.com
/archives/1252.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2000). A team of Australian lawyers, lead
by a justice of a territory supreme court, went to East Timor to gather evidence to
present to the U.N. in order to push for the creation of a tribunal. Id.
189. Indonesia agrees to facilitate UN probes into post-referendum violence,
Nov. 3, 2000 press release, at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/n31100.htm
(last visited Nov. 8, 2000).
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genocidal intent. Policy considerations, concerning political and
economic issues, are very important to the decision on the creation
of a tribunal for East Timor. A general overview of the elements of
genocide, analyzed in the context of the information available to
date on the consequences of the violence, is intended push the
Security Council's decision-making process beyond policy concerns
to the facts of the East Timor crisis.
A. Historical Relationship in Light of the Violence
An excellent analysis of Indonesia's political motivations in
general, and in East Timor specifically, was prepared soon after
violence erupted in East Timor by a retired U.N. staff member, who
lived in Indonesia for many years.' ° He noted that Indonesia is "a
creature of colonialism and would never have existed in its present
polyglot form without the arbitrary and dictatorial hand of a foreign
master for more than 400 years."'1 9 He followed by saying that,
since it became an independent country, "there has been constant
fear by its political establishment that a country as vast and diverse
as Indonesia could not in the long run survive as a single nation-
state."' In order to maintain their nation-state, political leaders
used "a blend of brutality and economic progress" in order to
maintain "stability at any price."'93
As noted above, Indonesia and East Timor began their
relationship following Portugal's abdication of its colonial
possessions in 1975."9 Prior to 1975, Indonesia exhibited little if any
interest in East Timor.195  However, once Portugal essentially
abandoned the eastern half of island, Indonesia, which controlled
the western half of Timor, felt they had a "manifest destiny," if you
will, to assume total control of the island."9 Through a series of
development projects and suppression of political opposition,
Indonesia proceeded to implement its "blend of brutality and
economic progress" in order to maintain "stability at any price" in
East Timor."9 The resistance movement was nearly destroyed, and
media and humanitarian groups were denied admittance to the
190. Oglesby, supra note 41.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Clark, supra note 17.
195. Oglesby, Indonesia in a Corner, supra note 41.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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territory. ' When the media was allowed to return, and the resist-
ance movement attempted to draw attention to the humanitarian
crisis in East Timor by nonviolent means, their demonstrations
were brutally repressed.'" Finally, once Indonesia acceded to a
referendum for East Timor, it responded to the people's vote for
independence with more brutality.2°°
Out of this history, some parallels to the conditions in Rwanda
before genocide occurred in that country can be discerned.
Rwanda, too, is "a creature of colonialism," having been occupied
by Belgium for many years. 20' The Belgians chose to educate only
the Tutsi minority, whom they considered superior to the Hutus,
who were conversely seen only as laborers and farmers."'
Resentment over this treatment grew over the years among the
Hutus, and although the two groups generally shared a common
language and culture, their societies were separate. 3 When the
Rwandan President's plane crashed, those people bent on assuming
power used long-held bigotry and paranoia to stir up fears that the
Tutsis would seek to regain power and murder the Hutus before
they could do the same. 4 Because Rwandan culture demanded
strict obedience and trust of those in command, the Hutus were
easily convinced that they must kill the Tutsi in order to avoid being
killed themselves.20
5
Given Indonesia's insecurity about being able to maintain its
status as a single nation-state in light of numerous uprisings on
other islands, a sound hypothesis as to the rationale behind
unleashing the militias was the goal of "sending a message" to other
islands in the archipelago. On the eastern Indonesian island of
Ambon, at least 55 people have died in sectarian violence, and
there is an ongoing insurgency on the island of Aceh.20' The TNI,
acting through militia groups, likely felt they could intimidate East
Timorese to vote against independence. In the event that strategy
failed, they needed to take measures to ensure that their fragile
control of the vast nation-state would be secure. The military
198. Timor Today: History - Resistance, supra note 43; see also, Clark, supra
note 17.
199. Id.
200. Richburg, supra note 59.
201. Akayesu, supra note 109, at 44.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Berkeley, supra note 99, at 26.
206. Keith B. Richburg, Indonesian Leader Tightens Grip on Military, WASH.
POST, Jan. 14, 2000, at A23.
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wanted to warn other islands that, if they believed they could
pressure the Indonesian government to grant them independence,
there would be grave consequences.
It is plausible that the military stirred up the fears and paranoia
of those East Timorese who were pro-Indonesia, much in the same
way they supported such groups when East Timor was freed from
Portuguese rule in 1975."7 They likely emphasized all of the
economic benefits Indonesia had bestowed upon East Timor,"8 and
how all of that was being forgotten by those ungrateful souls who
now sought independence. And while Indonesia may have a
legitimate argument along those lines, the economic development
was promulgated as a means of coercion and control of the East
Timorese population.'l Therefore, just as coercion and control
were central to the crisis in Rwanda, the violence in East Timor was
the product of Indonesia's desire to maintain its control, through
coercion, of not only the island but of its nation-state.
B. Security Council's Analysis of the Crisis
As stated earlier, the Security Council takes four factors into
consideration as a threshold matter in determining whether or not
to create an international criminal tribunal. The first of these,
whether the situation continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security, is addressed by the fact that the
militia groups continue to operate out of their bases in West
Timor."' It is believed that as many as 120,000 East Timorese
refugees are living in West Timor, and that they are being
intimidated and threatened by the militia groups and prevented
from returning home. " One year after the independence vote, the
Government of Indonesia finally announced plans for the
disarmament of militias in West Timor, but attacks on UNTAET
personnel continue." Furthermore, on other islands in Indonesia,
the TNI is responding to calls for independence with the same
207. Clark, supra note 17.
208. Oglesby, supra note 41.
209. Id.
210. Colum Lynch, U.S. Warns Against Coup by Military in Indonesia, WASH.
POST, Jan. 15, 2000, at A20.
211. Id.
212. Indonesia to disarm militia in West Timor, Security Council told, Sept. 20
press release, at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/n200900.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2000), and Jakarta alone is responsible for ending West Timor attacks,
Security Council told, Sept. 29 press release, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor
/news/n291000.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2000).
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brutal repression that it exercised in East Timor.213 The creation of
an international tribunal may serve to relieve Indonesia of the
burden of investigating the situation, so that it can focus on the
continuing chaos in the remainder of the country.
As to the second factor the Security Council will consider, its
contribution to the process of national reconciliation and to the
restoration and maintenance of peace, the status of the militia
groups is a major matter.214 By initiating the process of investigating
the atrocities and, subsequently handing out indictments, a tribunal
could make the leaders of the militia groups less willing to assert
their presence in the country. For example, after the creation of the
tribunal for Rwanda and issuing of indictments that followed, many
of the most notorious of the perpetrators arrested were found
215hiding in other countries. Such a result would encourage the
numerous refugees in West Timor, and on other islands of
Indonesia, to return to East Timor to stimulate the rebuilding
process.
Furthermore, it is alleged that the militia groups had been
responding to orders from TNI leaders.216 In fact, for a time there
was speculation that the TNI may have been poised to overthrow
the Indonesian government in order to avoid an international
investigation of the alleged atrocities in East Timor.217 It would
seem that, if the military had nothing to hide, they would not be
concerned about the possibility of a U.N. tribunal. Since the
military leaders were in fact concerned about the prospect of a
deeper U.N. investigation, it is a strong sign that the situation in
East Timor was more dire than the military leaders allowed. 8
Next, the Security Council will decide whether prosecution of
the perpetrators would contribute to ensuring that the violations
are halted and effectively redressed.219 This consideration is closely
tied to the fourth factor, whether there is a need for international
cooperation to strengthen the courts and judicial system of the
particular country, and the ability of those courts to deal with large
numbers of suspects.2 The physical infrastructure of East Timor
was almost completely destroyed in the violence following the
213. Richburg, supra note 206.
214. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 100; see also supra note 212.
215. Fact Sheet No. 1, supra note 110.
216. Lynch, supra note 210.
217. Id.
21& See Richburg articles supra note 82, regarding statements of TNI leaders to
the media on the extent of the East Timor crisis.
219. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 100.
220. Id.
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independence vote 221, and the political and economic apparatus of
East Timor was strongly dependent on Indonesia.2  It will take
quite some time before East Timor becomes fully self-sustaining in
these respects." Likewise, as one relief worker in East Timor said,
"there are no laws yet in East Timor.'
224
Indonesia counters that, since East Timor was part of
Indonesia at the time of the violence, Indonesian courts and law
should be applied.2 5 Its national judicial mechanism is functioning
and capable of dispensing justice, and national remedies should be
exhausted before resorting to an international forum.226 For the
time being, the U.N. has foregone the creation of an International
Criminal Tribunal out of respect for Indonesia's sovereignty.
However, the U.N. remains heavily involved in East Timor through
UNTAET, and should continue to monitor Indonesia's efforts to
bring the perpetrators of the September 1999 violence to justice.
Overarching the decision to allow Indonesia to prosecute the
East Timor situation are policy considerations, tied closely to
political and economic concerns. In essence, the political factors
were explored in assessing the four factors, in that at the time of the
decision, there existed the possibility that the TNI might attempt to
overthrow the government. This crisis, though, seems to have
passed, and the Wahid administration has relatively firm control of
the Indonesian government. Also, the crisis in East Timor seemed
to create a domino effect, such that other islands in the Indonesian
archipelago are seeking independence for themselves. 7 Perhaps
another factor in the decision to allow Indonesia to prosecute is the
fact that the U.N. has not acted against the major powers for
attempting to repress independence movements, for instance,
Russia's activities in Chechnya. The possible creation of a double
standard would be unfair to Indonesia.
Deciding whether or not to proceed with a U.N. tribunal under
such a political climate is linked with economic considerations for
Indonesia and the western world. As the fourth most-populous
country in the world, Indonesia presents a vast market for the
221. Richburg, supra note 95.
222. Oglesby, supra note 41.
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224. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 100.
225. Letter dated 26 January 2000 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Indonesia to the Secretary-General, supra note 186.
226. Id.
227. Richburg, supra note 216.
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corporations of America and western Europe.2 By upsetting the
political structure in Indonesia, the doors of that vast market may
close, meaning a lost economic opportunity. While it is always
important to recognize political and economic ramifications on
issues of international law, such considerations cannot be allowed
to completely overwhelm the facts of the situation.
C. Genocide in East Timor?
In order for the Security Council to assess the political and
economic considerations inherent in deciding whether to initiate an
international criminal tribunal in light of the facts of the East Timor
crisis, a brief review of the Akayesu case is helpful. Prosecution
under genocide is not the only remedy available to an international
criminal tribunal;229 however, because proving genocidal intent is
difficult, it seemed to be the appropriate point of inquiry.
Specifically, if a potential prima facie case for genocide can be
established from a general inquiry of the situation, the U.N.
Security Council may be persuaded to overlook political and
economic concerns and create an international criminal tribunal.
As noted in the earlier analysis of the Akayesu decision, the
Genocide Convention requires that certain acts be committed with
the specific "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.""'  Among the acts for
which Akayesu was indicted were the failure to act to stop
systematic rape and murder, as well as facilitation of those acts;
ordering the killing of intellectuals and influential people;
commencing house-to-house searches for such people; and threat-
ening serious bodily harm to those who would not divulge the
whereabouts of such people.' The tribunal was able to infer
genocidal intent from all his acts or utterances, and from the
general context in which other culpable acts were perpetrated
systematically against the same group.232 The ICTR pointedly
announced for the first time that rape is now considered an element
of genocide.233
According to the International Commission of Inquiry on East
Timor, witnesses gave evidence that intimidation and terror were
228. Jim Hoagland, Outside the Zone, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1999, at A21.
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systematically used, and resulted in many killings and injuries.234
Also, women were the objects of sexual abuse and rape.235
Likewise, the commission was told of the destruction of evidence
including removal of bodies from the site of killings.236 It is also
clear that East Timorese were systematically removed from their
homes and sent to refugee camps, and there is evidence that women
and children were separated from men.237
Each of these alleged acts falls within the enumerated culpable
acts of the Genocide Convention, as enunciated in Akayesu.238 The
most important question to answer, then, is whether it is reasonable
to conclude that these acts were "committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such., 239 The ICTR found that the Genocide Convention
was drafted for the purpose of protecting any stable or permanent
group.2" Certainly, the East Timorese would fall under such a
denomination, beside the fact that they are a national and ethnical
group distinct from the Indonesians.
In determining whether or not the aforementioned acts were
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the East
Timorese, it is important to reemphasize the historical relationship
between these countries. Indonesia maintained strict control of
East Timor through a juxtaposition of development programs and
brutal suppression of political expression, perhaps to avoid
becoming a small, politically-insignificant country again. ' They
likely felt that the East Timorese were indebted to them for the
economic and social programs Indonesia had bestowed upon East
Timor, overlooking their heavy-handed tactics in quelling all
dissenters.42 The Indonesian government allowed the independ-
ence vote only after intense pressure from the outside world, and
then when the East Timorese voted for independence, the response
was violence by TNI-controlled militias. Specific attacks were
made against individuals who were noted as being outspoken in the
independence movement.243 It seems quite rational to conclude that
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the purpose of the militia attacks was to destroy, at least in part, the
East Timorese for daring to desire freedom.
V. Conclusion
Based on Indonesia's history of brutal repression of East
Timor and the specific intent of the Indonesian-military-controlled
militia groups to destroy, at least in part, the East Timorese, it is
appropriate for the U.N. Security Council to create an international
criminal tribunal for East Timor. From the inception of their
relationship, Indonesia used a system of economic coercion and
violent control to maintain power in East Timor.244 The East
Timorese were finally granted an opportunity to gain independ-
ence, and when they seized upon that opportunity, Indonesia,
through the TNI and the militias, showed its disregard, and perhaps
hatred, of East Timorese people and culture through violence. It is
known that at least 1,650 people were killed, including many
intellectuals and influential people2 45, and the largest towns of East
Timor were at least sixty percent destroyed.246
The threat of a coup by the military in order to avoid a U.N.
investigation was a real threat at the time the U.N. acceded to
Indonesia's desire to prosecute the East Timor situation. A coup
would have been disastrous to the country and the region, apart
from its effect on a U.N. investigation. However, that threat seems
to have passed, and the Wahid government has maintained
balanced control over the past year. But outbreaks of brutal
repression in a manner similar to that in East Timor are taking
place in other islands in the archipelago, as more people rightfully
seek their independence. 7 If the appropriate people are not
brought to justice under the Indonesian-run prosecution,
Indonesia's twisted methodology of maintaining control of their
nation-state will continue without remorse. A key question may be
whether the world desires to maintain Indonesia as a single nation-
state, or whether the individual nations of the archipelago can
maintain a viable existence as independent countries. East Timor is
the test case, and for the most part it is succeeding. In order to help
East Timor reach independent viability, the U.N. should look
beyond political and economic considerations to the facts of the
crisis, and create an International Criminal Tribunal with the goal
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of allowing East Timor and Indonesia to reconcile their past and
move on to a new era of peace.
Philip J. Curtin

